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Abstract: Location-based Services (LBS) have become very 
popular with the rapid development of Internet of Things 
(IoT) technology and the ubiquitous use of smartphones and 
social networks in our daily lives. Although users can enjoy 
a lot of flexibility and conveniences from the LBS in IoT, 
they may also lose their privacy. Untrusted or malicious LBS 
servers having all users’ information and thus can track users 
in various ways or release personal data to third parties. In 
this work, we first analyze the dummy-location selection 
(DLS) algorithm—an efficient location privacy preservation 
approach and design an attack algorithm for DLS (ADLS), an 
emerging IoT for testing security. For efficiently preserving 
user’s location privacy, we propose a novel dummy location 
privacy-preserving (DLP) algorithm, which considers both of 
the computational costs and various privacy requirements of 
different users. We conduct extensive simulation 
experiments to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed 
schemes. Evaluation results show that the ADLS algorithm 
has a high probability of identifying the user’s real location 
out from chosen dummy locations in the DLS algorithm. 
When compared with the DLS algorithm, the results show 
that our proposed DLP algorithm not only has a lower 
probability of revealing the user’s real location, but also can 
reduce the computational cost and efficiency (i.e., time, speed, 
accuracy, and  complexity) while providing the same 
privacy level as DLS algorithm. 
Key words: Privacy preserving; Location privacy; Location 
based services; k-anonymization 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been a rapid development in mobile 
technology resulting in the immense popularity of a variety 
of mobile devices and social networks and contributions to 
the development of emerging IoT services [1-4]. Many of 
these developments rely on the utilization of location-based 
services (LBS) or LBS applications. Today’s smartphones 
have built in Global Positioning System (GPS) modules that 
have powerful computation ability to process users’ location 
information. Users can download many of LBS applications 
from various sites such as the Apple Store or Google Play 
Store. With the help of these applications, users can send their 
queries which include their identities, locations (e.g., got by 
the GPS module using localization techniques), interests, and 
other information (e.g., time, query range) to LBS server, for 
geting the required information such as the nearest shopping 
mall, supermarket, restaurant. However, while enjoying the 
convenience or entertainment from the LBS server, users are 
susceptible to the leakage of their sensitive information in IoT 
leading to the risks of loss of privacy. Based on a user’s LBS 
queries, an adversary not only can link their identity with 
locations and interests, but also infer more private 
information about the user. For example, if a user often 
reveals his/her location close to a hospital when requesting 
LBS in IoT, the location information could be used by an 
adversary to conjecture that the user may have some health 
problems. Since the untrusted LBS server has all the 
information about users such as where they are at what time, 
what kind of queries they submit, etc., the LBS server may 
use the information to track users in all kinds of ways or 
reveal users’ personal data to third parties. Therefore, it’s 
necessary to pay more attention to users’ location privacy, 
particularly for a data-driven IoT service that delivers the 
requirements for IoT and big data fusion. 
  As large amount of data from different sources are 
gathered and processed, the IoT may have significant impact 
on users’ privacy. Moreover, considering the increasing trend 
to collect more individual and personalized data in IoT, there 
are many problems regarding the impact on individuals’ 
privacy from a legal perspective [42]. The data handling or 
processing of Internet of Things (IoT) is greatly impacted by 
location information and in turn greatly impact location 
privacy. Since location information is a major component in 
effective inventory and supply chains, efficient transportation 
systems, context-aware mobile applications, and numerous 
other IoT systems [43]. Furthermore, privacy attacks and 
harmful consequences can occur when sensitive location 
information is concealed or controlled without users’ consent, 
which pose challenges for IoT security and privacy [44-46]. 
A large number of approaches [5-17] have been proposed 
to address the privacy preservation issue in location based 
services. Many of them are based on the cloaking technique, 
which employs the k-anonymity model to protect user’s 
location privacy. The k-anonymity model is an important 
technique to protect user’s location privacy in LBS, it can 
ensure that a user is identified with a probability of (only) 1/k. 
To achieve k-anonymity in LBS, a user first submits a query 
  
to a centralized location anonymizer. Then, the location 
anonymizer enlarges the queried location into a bigger 
Cloaking Region (CR) for covering many other users (at least 
k-1) geographically distributed. Finally, the location 
anonymizer sends the query to the LBS server. However, 
since this technique relies heavily on the location anonymizer, 
there will be a single point of failure. Moreover, since all 
users’ queries must be processed by the location anonymizer, 
the location anonymizer may be a performance bottleneck. 
To address this problem, the “dummy location” has been 
proposed and used to protect user’s location privacy, which 
does not need any third party service. Dummy location is part 
of our emerging IoT service. Existing approaches [18-20] try 
to effectively generate dummy locations which cannot be 
distinguished by the LBS server. However, these approaches 
do not consider the side information [21], i.e., users’ query 
probability related to location and time, or information 
related to the semantics of the query such as the gender and 
social status of the user. If the side information is obtained by 
an adversary, incredible chosen dummy locations such as 
lakes, swamps etc. may be easily filtered out by the adversary. 
Therefore, these algorithms for dummy locations generation 
cannot effectively achieve k-anonymity. The authors in [22] 
proposed a dummy location selection (DLS) algorithm for 
location privacy preservation, which considers the side 
information that may be exploited by attackers. However, the 
computational cost (i.e., time complexity) of the DLS 
algorithm is very high. As a result, how to select dummy 
locations is still a challenge, particularly for a data-driven IoT 
service whereby more complexity can be involved with 
volume, velocity, variety, veracity and validity. Locations 
based service is one of the major application for a data-driven 
IoT service and it contains highly sensitive data which needs 
to be protected. LBS based cloud applications needs to collect, 
process, and analyze geo-position data or send the required 
geo-locations instantly for millions of users in real-time. LBS 
is useful for many cases include identifying location in an 
unfamiliar territory and finding local important places for 
socialization. However, LBS based applications also come 
with risk of revealing personal information and data that may 
be tracked. Despite personal identification information may 
be hidden in the LBS services, the geo-localised history of 
user requests can act as a quasi-identifier which then can be 
used to identify personal information about individuals data 
and their locations. Hence, we need efficient strategies to hide 
this quasi-identification which can only be handled by 
dummy LBS data. 
In this paper, we first analyze the performance of the well 
known DLS algorithm, which is an efficient location privacy 
preservation approach for a data-driven IoT service of users’ 
queries in LBS. Then, we design an attack algorithm for DLS 
(ADLS), whose goal is to identify the user’s real location out 
from the data-driven IoT service of chosen dummy locations 
in LBS. We also design a dummy location based privacy-
preserving (DLP) algorithm for location privacy preservation 
in LBS. Different from existing approaches, the DLP 
algorithm makes a tradeoff between computational cost (i.e., 
time complexity) and the privacy requirements of users. The 
main contributions of this research are as follows: 
 We analyze the performance of the DLS algorithm, and 
design an attack algorithm for DLS (ADLS), whose goal 
is to identify the user’s real location out from the data-
driven IoT service of chosen dummy locations.  
 We propose an entropy-based DLP algorithm, which 
selects dummy locations in a greedy manner making a 
tradeoff between computational cost (i.e., time complexity) 
and the privacy requirements for the  data-driven IoT 
service in LBS. 
 We analyze the performance on privacy preservation of 
our proposed DLP algorithm against the colluding attack 
and inference attack. These attacks are aimed to test 
robustness of our data-driven IoT service. 
 We show our proof-of-concepts by using simulations. 
Simulation results demonstrate that the ADLS algorithm 
has a high probability of query recognition for the DLS 
algorithm. When compared with the DLS algorithm, the 
results show that the DLP algorithm can efficiently reduce 
the computational cost (i.e., time complexity) while 
providing the same privacy level as the DLS algorithm. 
Moreover, the DLP algorithm has a lower probability of 
query recognition (i.e., lower probability of losing users’ 
privacy) compared to the DLS algorithm. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 reviewses the related work. Section 3 introduces the 
preliminaries and the system model. Section 4 gives the 
detailed analysis on the DLS algorithm. Section 5 presents 
the ADLS algorithm for identifying the user real location and 
evaluate its performance. Section 6 presents the detailed 
descriptions on our DLP algorithm and simulation results. 
Section 7 gives the discussions and explains how our 
contributions are relevant to the data-driven IoT service. 
Section 8 concludes this paper. 
2. RELATED WORK 
In this section, we describe recent researches related to 
privacy protection methods in location based services of IoT. 
2.1 Privacy-preserving for IoT 
Several recent researches have been conducted for the 
privacy-preserving for the IoT based services [47-55]. In 
order to handle the massive amount of data, the most 
convincing solution is the federation of the IoT and cloud 
computing. Henze, et al. presented an user-driven privacy 
enforcement appraoch for cloud-based services in the IoT, 
which focuses on privacy preserving for individual end-users 
[47]. The authors in [48] proposed PAgIoT, a Privacy-
preserving Aggregation protocol suitable for IoT settings and 
enables multi-attribute aggregation for groups of entities 
while allowing for privacy-preserving value correlation. A 
lightweight privacy-preserving trust model had been 
  
designed for minimizing privacy loss in the presence of 
untrusted service providers, so that providers can be 
prevented from disclosing information to third parties for 
secondary uses [49]. A conditional privacy-preserving 
authentication with access linkability (CPAL) for roaming 
service, to provide universal secure roaming service and 
multilevel privacy preservation [50]. The authors in [51] 
estimated the cost of breaking public key crypto systems 
when the adversary is limited by the available resources and 
time and presentd the trade-off between the processing load 
for an IoT node versus the desired time span of privacy 
protection. Jin, et al., presented a framework for the 
realization of smart cities through the Internet of Things 
(IoT), which encompasses the complete urban information 
system and forms a transformational part of the existing 
cyber-physical system [52]. The authors in [53] proposed a 
privacy-by-design (PbD) framework that can guide software 
engineers to systematically assess the privacy capabilities of 
IoT applications and middleware platforms, thus the 
proposed PbD framework can also be used to design new IoT 
platforms. 
2.2 Location Anonymization Approach for LBS 
  Location anonymization approach is one of most important 
techniques to protect location privacy, which attempts to 
make user’s location indistinguishable from a certain number 
of other users. Commonly used techniques include spatial-
temporal cloaking and location obfuscation. k-anonymity is 
an important technique for location anonymization, which 
relies on a centralized location anonymizer to enlarge a user’s 
queried location into a bigger Cloaking Region (CR) for 
covering many other users. A personalized k-anonymity 
model is proposed in [23]. The model enables a user to have 
different privacy requirements in different contexts, and 
different users can require different levels of privacy in the 
same context. In the proposed model in [23], the trusted 
anonymization server runs an efficient message perturbation 
engine, which performs location anonymization considering 
the trade-off between location privacy and quality of service 
(QoS). A cloaking algorithm based on k-anonymity and l-
diversity has been proposed in [24]. When constructing a 
cloaking region, it ensures that a cloaking region has at least 
k vehicles (k-anonymity) and l road segments (l-diversity), 
which can effectively protect user’s location privacy. The 
authors in [25] studied the problem that how to protect the 
location privacy under various privacy threats, and proposed 
a location privacy framework uses k-anonymization and 
pseudo-anonymization methods to provide efficient location 
privacy preservation. A weighted adjacency graph based k-
anonymous cloaking technique is proposed in [26], which can 
support k-nearest neighbor queries without revealing private 
information of the query initiator. The algorithm in [26] not 
only can ensure user privacy protection, but also reduce 
bandwidth usages. The concept of mix zones is first proposed 
in [27]. A mix zone is referred to a spatial region in which 
none of users has registered any application callback. The 
authors in [28] allowed users to exchange their pseudonyms 
when they meet in a mix zone, which ensures a user avoid 
using a long-term pseudonym. Thus, the relationship between 
user pseudonyms and locations can be broken though 
exchanging pseudonyms. 
2.3 Policy or Cryptography Primitive based Approach 
Policy and cryptography primitive based approaches [29-
31] protect user privacy by using encryption techniques. The 
authors in [32] propose a privacy preserving framework 
(PLAM) for local-area mobile social networks. The PLAM 
framework not only employs a privacy-preserving request 
aggregation protocol with k-anonymity and l-diversity 
properties to keep user’s preference privacy without adopting 
a trusted anonymizer server when querying location-based 
service, but also integrates unlinkable pseudo-ID technique 
to achieve users’ identity privacy and location privacy. The 
PLAM framework can not only satisfy the desirable privacy 
requirements but also resist outside attacks on source 
authentication, data integrity and availability. For preserving 
user’s privacy, the authors in [33] proposed a dynamic 
pseudo-ID scheme, where different pseudo-IDs are adopted 
in different queries in order to unlink the correlation between 
user’s real identity and trajectory. In [34], the authors propose 
a fine-grained privacy preserving LBS framework (FINE) for 
mobile devices. The FINE framework not only employs a 
ciphertext-policy anonymous attribute based encryption 
technique to achieve fine-grained access control, location 
privacy, confidentiality of the LBS data and its access rule, 
and accurate LBS query result without involving any trusted 
third party, but also integrates the transformation key and 
proxy re-encryption to migrate most of computation intensive 
tasks from LBS provider and users to cloud server. In [35], 
the authors study the k nearest neighbor (kNN) queries where 
mobile users query the LBS provider about k nearest points 
of interests (POIs) on the basis of their current location, and 
then propose a solution built on the Paillier public-key 
cryptosystem for preserving the location privacy and data 
privacy in kNN queries of mobile users. The authors in [36] 
design a private block retrieval protocol, and propose a secure 
and efficient location based service system.  In the proposed 
system, users can retrieve information of interest associated 
with the current location without leaking their location 
information to the service provider. 
2.4 Dummy Location Selection for IoT 
Dummy location approach focuses on selecting dummy 
locations for users in order to protect users’ location privacy. 
In [20], the authors first study the behaviors of self-interested 
users in the LBS system from a game-theoretic perspective. 
The work then formulates two Bayesian game models in both 
static and timing-aware contexts, and analyzes the existence 
and properties of the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium for the two 
models. A Dummy-Location Selection (DLS) algorithm is 
proposed in [22] to achieve k-anonymity for users using LBS. 
The DLS algorithm selects dummy locations considering that 
  
the side information may be exploited by adversaries, which 
is based on the entropy metric [37]. To make sure that the 
selected dummy locations are spreaded as far as possible, the 
authors in [22] also propose an enhanced-DLS algorithm, 
which can enlarge the cloaking region while keeping similar 
privacy level as the DLS algorithm. The authors in [38] 
propose two dummy generation methods: circle-based and 
grid-based, which take into account privacy area 
requirements. In [39], the authors proposed two dummy 
based solutions to achieve k-anonymity for privacy-area 
aware users in LBS with considering that side information 
may be exploited by adversaries. 
However, most of these existing approaches have not 
considered the side information that may be exploited by 
attackers when selecting dummy locations in IoT. Even if 
some approaches have taken into acount the side information, 
but the computational costs (i.e., time complexities) of them 
are very high. Therefore, how to efficiently select dummy 
locations in IoT still remains a challenge, and our proposal 
will be presented between Section 3 and 6. 
3. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we describe the main basic concepts and the 
system model. 
3.1 Side Information   
As mentioned in previous section, the side information [21] 
may be query probability of users related to location and time, 
or information related to the semantics of the query such as 
the gender and social status of the user. In this paper, the side 
information is considered to be the query probability of users 
related to location, called query probability. A particular 
user’s query probability at a certain location can be denoted 
by the ratio of the number of current location queries to the 
number of total queries of all locations, as shown in Equation 
(1).  
 
  
i
number of  queries in location i
q
number of  queries in all locations
       (1) 
Generally, users can get two kinds of side information 
from a system: partial information and global information. 
Partial information denotes the information collected by 
other users, for example, a particular user may know the 
query probabilities related to some locations. Since the LBS 
server can receive the LBS queries of all users, the LBS 
server can obtain the global information (i.e., the query 
probabilities related to all locations). For a particular user, it’s 
necessary to design an optimal strategy to select dummy 
locations for protecting his/her location privacy under the 
condition of knowing the global information. In this paper, 
the LBS server is responsible for disseminating and updating 
the global side information so that users can get this 
information from a well-known place (e.g., local database of 
LBS application).  
3.2 Entropy-based Privacy Metric 
In this work, the degree of privacy is measured by the 
entropy. It can be seen as the uncertainty in identifying a 
user’s real location out from the chosen dummy locations 
[37]. When calculating the entropy, each dummy location 
should have a probability, which can be the history query 
probability of users related to location. We use pi to denote 
the historic query probability of users related to location i. 
According to the set of dummy locations and the historic 
query probabilities, we can define the entropy H of a user as 
in Equation (2). 
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1
log
k
i i
i
H q q

                 (2) 
where 
1
k
i i i
i
q p p

  , is the normalized query probability of 
location i; and the sum of all pi is equal to 1. 
Since the greater the entropy the higher the uncertainty in 
identifying the user’s real location from the dummy locations 
set, our goal is to obtain enough entropy. In particular, when 
all of the k dummy locations have the same historical query 
probability, we can achieve the maximum entropy Hmax = log2 
k. 
3.3 System Model for IoT 
We design our system model based on the system 
architecture in [19]. The system mainly consists of two 
parties: the LBS server and LBS users with mobile devices. 
1) LBS server: The LBS server can be a service provider, 
which not only stores all kinds of service databases, but also 
can update the service data and provide users with various 
services. In our system, the LBS server is responsible to 
receive service queries from users, search for requested 
service data in the database, and reply with the search results 
back to the users. In addition, the LBS server is able to obtain 
the global information based on queries of all users at all 
locations, which can be the historical query probabilities of 
users related to all locations. Moreover, the LBS server is 
responsible for disseminating and updating the global side 
information so that users can get this information from a well-
known place (e.g., local database of LBS application).  
2) LBS users: The system typically consists of users who 
are equipped with mobile devices (e.g., smart phones or 
tablets), with built-in GPS modules that can be used to obtain 
user’s location data. Due to the rapid development of mobile 
devices and social networks, a variety of LBS applications 
can be accessible for users. If users want to get services from 
LBS servers, they need to send queries to LBS server, which 
include their identity, location information, interests, and the 
query range (e.g., 1000m). In order to protect user’s location 
privacy, user’s location information not only includes user’s 
real location, but also includes many other dummy locations. 
  
4. ANALYSIS OF THE DLS ALGORITHM 
4.1 Review the DLS Algorithm 
The main purpose of Dummy-Location Selection (DLS) 
algorithm [22] is to generate a set of realistic dummy 
locations to protect user’s location privacy. Given the degree 
of anonymity k, the DLS algorithm needs to select other k-1 
dummy locations based on the side information. The 
following shows the 5 steps how the DLS algorithm 
addresses this problem: 
(i) In the first step, a particular user needs to determine the 
degree of anonymity k.  
(ii)Then, the algorithm reads all of the obtained query 
probabilities and then sorts the query probabilities of all 
locations in ascending order.  
(iii) In the sorted list, the algorithm needs to choose 2k 
candidate locations, whose history query probabilities are 
similar to the user’s real location. In the 2k candidate 
locations, it randomly selects k –1 locations. Then, it derives 
m sets, each set contains k locations. For each set, one 
location is user’s real location and the other k−1 locations are 
randomly chosen from the 2k candidates. The entropy for the 
jth(j∈[1,m]) set can be calculated according to Equation (2) 
as shown in Section 3.  
  (iv) Finally, the algorithm has to determine an optimal 
location set with the biggest entropy to effectively achieve k-
anonymity for the user. 
4.2 Preparations for Performance Analysis 
Table 1: Summary of key notations 
Notation Meaning 
N Number of all locations. 
k The privacy level requirement of user. 
P[N]  The historical query probabilities in all locations. 
m 
Number of randomly selecting k–1 locations from 
2k locations, i.e., m = C
k-1 
2k . 
Pi The historical query probability at location i. 
Lreal The real location of user. 
Pi[2k] 
The chosen 2k candidates at location i, where k 
candidates are left before Lreal and the other k 
candidates are right after Lreal in the sorted list. 
Ci[k]  The chosen optimal location set at location i. 
k’ 
The number of locations which have the same 
historical query probability as Lreal 
in Pi . 
Let the historical query probabilities of all locations P = 
[p1, p2,…,pN], the chosen 2k candidate locations at location i 
as Pi ={pi,1, pi,2,…, pi,2k}and the chosen 2k candidate locations 
at location j as Pj ={pj,1, pj,2,…, pj,2k}. Then, let Pii =Pi∪ {pi}, 
and Pij =Pii∩Pjj. Let M denote the size of set Pij. We define 
Pij as follows. 
(1) (2) ( ){ , ,..., }, 0
 , =0
M
ij
p p p M
P
M

 

       (3) 
Theorem 1: Under the condition of m = C
k-1 
2k , for i, j ∈ [1, 
N], Ci ≠Cj (i≠j), set P must satisfy the following conditions:  
(i)  i ≠ j, pi ≠ pj, i.e., each location has a unique historical 
query probability. 
(ii) 0 ≤ M ≤ 2k, i, j (i ≠ j), Pij ∩ Ci ≠ Ci or Pij ∩ Cj ≠ Cj; 
that is to say when 0 ≤ M ≤ 2k, i, j (i ≠ j), the chosen optimal 
location set at location i or location j is not included in the 
intersection of the chosen 2k candidate locations at location i 
and the chosen 2k candidate locations at location j.  
Proof:  
Adequacy:  
(1) We first prove that set P must satisfy condition (i). 
We assume that set P does not satisfy condition (i), and 
then  i, j ∈ [1, N], pi = pj (i ≠ j). Thus, Pi and Pj will be the 
same according to the step (ii) in DLS algorithm. 
When k' ≥ k + 1, although Ci may not be the same as Cj 
according to the step (iii) and (iv) in DLS algorithm, it is 
possible that Ci = Cj. However, according to our assumption 
that Ci cannot be the same as Cj. Thus, set P must satisfy 
condition (i). 
When k' ≤ k, Ci must be the same as Cj according to steps 
(iii) and (iv) in DLS algorithm. However, according to our 
assumption, Ci cannot be the same as Cj. Thus, set P must 
satisfy condition (i). 
(2) We then prove that set P must satisfy condition (ii) after 
satisfying the condition (i). 
We assume that set P satisfies condition (i), but does not 
satisfy condition (ii). Thus,  i, j ∈ [1, N], Pij ∩ Ci = Ci and 
Pij ∩ Cj = Cj. Since Ci and Cj both are the optimal location set 
in set Pij, i.e., Ci = Cj. However, according to our assumption, 
set Ci cannot be the same as set Cj. Thus, set P must satisfy 
condition (i) and condition (ii). 
Necessity: 
According to condition (i), we can get that for i ≠ j, Pi ≠ 
Pj. Then, we discuss the condition (ii) as follows. 
(1) 0 ≤ M ≤ 2k,  i ≠ j, Pij ∩ Ci ≠ Ci and Pij ∩ Cj ≠ Cj. For 
this situation, set Ci must include the location from set Pi-Pij, 
which does not belong to set Cj. Moreover, set Cj must also 
include the location from Pj-Pij, which does not belong to set 
Ci. Thus, for i ≠ j, Ci ≠ Cj. 
(2) 0 ≤ M ≤ 2k,  i ≠ j, Pij ∩ Ci ≠ Ci and Pij ∩ Cj = Cj. For this 
situation, set Ci must include the location from set Pi-Pij, 
which does not belong to set Cj. Therefore, for i ≠ j , Ci ≠ Cj.  
(3) 0 ≤ M ≤ 2k,  i ≠ j, Pij ∩ Ci = Ci and Pij ∩ Cj ≠ Cj. For 
this situation, set Cj must include the location from set Pj-Pij, 
which does not belong to set Ci. Thus, for i ≠ j, Ci ≠ Cj. 
Therefore, we can conclude that for i ≠ j, Ci ≠ Cj
 
when 
set P satisfies conditions (i) and (ii). 
4.3 Performance Analysis for DLS Algorithm 
Based on step (iii) in the DLS algorithm, we can see that 
the greater of value of m the higher the computational cost of 
the DLS algorithm is. We also can see that different values of 
  
m may result in different optimal location sets in DLS 
algorithm, and the DLS algorithm can obtain the optimal 
location set when m = C
k-1 
2k . We analyze the performance of 
the DLS algorithm when m = C
k-1 
2k as follows. 
(1)  i, j ∈ [1, N], pi = pj (i ≠ j) in set P. We assume that a 
particular user is at location i, and the number of locations 
whose query probabilities are the same as that of the user’s 
real location in the chosen candidate locations is denoted by 
k'. Since pi = pj, set Pi the user selects at location i is the same 
as set Pj the user selects at location j in DLS algorithm. We 
then discuss the performance of the DLS algorithm in the 
following situations. When 1 ≤ k' ≤ k-1, set Ci is the same as 
set Cj in DLS algorithm under the condition m = C
k-1 
2k . In this 
situation, although the LBS server can infer the probability 
for a user to submit a LBS query, the server cannot know the 
user’s real location. This is because there are other locations 
whose query probabilities are the same as that of the user’s 
real location. Moreover, the larger k' is, the better the 
performance of the DLS algorithm is. When k' ≥ k, Ci may be 
different from Cj. The reason is that randomly selecting k-1 
locations from the k' locations whose query probabilities are 
the same as pi may be the optimal location set. In this 
situation, since each location has the same query probability, 
the DLS algorithm achieves the best performance. 
(2) i, j ∈ [1, N], pi ≠ pj (i ≠ j) in set P. We assume that a 
particular user is at location i. Since pi ≠pj, set Pi the user 
selects at location i must be different from the set Pj user 
selects at location j. However, when M ≥ k-1, Ci may be the 
same as Cj, that is to say the chosen optimal location set at 
location i is likely to be the same as the chosen optimal 
location set at location j. In this situation, although the LBS 
server may try to infer which location is most likely to select 
this location set, the server may make a incorrect decision. 
The reason is that the optimal location sets chosen by the user 
in other locations are the same as that of the user’s real 
location. Moreover, the larger the number of locations whose 
chosen optimal location sets are the same as the that of user’s 
real location is, the better the performance of the DLS 
algorithm is. However, once there is no location whose 
chosen optimal location set is the same as other locations in 
set P, the DLS algorithm would have bad performance. 
5. ADLS ALGORITHM DESIGN 
In this section, we first introduce an attack model and related 
theories, then give detailed descriptions of ADLS algorithm 
and the performance evaluations. 
5.1 Attack Model 
In order to protect location privacy, the dummy location 
generation algorithm is used for generating some dummy 
locations. Thus, the users’ location information not only 
includes users’ real location, but also includes other chosen 
dummy locations [38]. The goal of the adversary is to obtain 
the user’s real location from the user’s location information. 
Since adversaries can compromise the LBS server and obtain 
all the information that the LBS server knows and holds. Thus, 
in this work, we assume that the LBS server is the adversary. 
Note that, LBS server is able to obtain global side information 
and monitor the current queries being sent from users. 
Furthermore, the LBS server can obtain the historic data of a 
particular user as well as the current situation and information. 
Additionally, the mechanisms used for location privacy 
protection in the system are also known by the LBS server. 
5.2 Related Theories 
Let set P = [p1, p2,…, pn], where 0 < pi < 1(1 ≤ i ≤ n). We 
define function H(P, pn+1 ) in Equation (4). 
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In Equation (4), function H(P, pn+1) varies with pn+1, where 
0< pn+1 <1. In order to get the maximum value of H(P, pn+1), 
we first calculate the derivative of function H(P, pn+1), 
denoted by function D(P, pn+1) as shown in Equation (5). 
Then, let function D(P, pn+1) be zero to get the value of pn+1 
as shown in Equation (6). Finally, we can get the extreme 
points of function H(P, pn+1). From Equation (6), we can 
know that function H(P, pn+1) has a unique extreme point.  
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When pn +1 < ?̅?n+1, the value of function D(P, pn+1) is greater 
than zero, and the value of function H(P, pn+1) increases with 
the growth of pn+1. When pn+1 > ?̅?n+1 the value of function 
D(P, pn+1)is less than zero, the value of function H(P, pn+1) 
decreases with the growth of pn+1. Thus, we have that the 
maximum point of function H(P, pn+1) is pn+1 = ?̅?n+1. We can 
obtain the range of ?̅?n+1 by Equation (7). From Equation (7), 
we can see that the value of pn+1 is not greater than the 
  
maximum of set P, and also not less than the minimum of set 
P. In our ADLS algorithm, we can use this property to select 
dummy locations. 
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5.3 The ADLS Algorithm  
The main goal of the ADLS algorithm is to identify the 
user’s real location out from the dummy locations obtained 
by the DLS algorithm. When obtaining a user’s LBS query, 
an adversary can adopt two methods to infer the user’s real 
location based on user’s location information. One method is 
to randomly choose one location from user’s location 
information as the user’s real location. By this method, the 
probability of successfully identifying the user’s real location 
is 1/k, and the probability remains stable. The other method 
is to analyze the dummy location generation algorithm, and 
then design an attack algorithm. By this method, the 
adversary can enhance the probability of successfully 
identifying the user’s real location by designing a good attack 
algorithm. In this paper, we adopt the latter method to infer 
user’s real location. Based on the analysis of the DLS 
algorithm in section 4, we know that once the history query 
probabilities of two locations are different in DLS algorithm, 
their chosen optimal dummy location sets must be different. 
In this paper, we use this property to infer the user’s real 
location out from the user’s location information. 
The ADLS algorithm first gets the anonymity degree k 
according to the user’s location information. Then, for the 
ith(1≤i≤k) location in user’s location information, the ADLS 
algorithm selects other k-1 dummy locations based on 
entropy in a greedy manner, and then obtains the dummy 
location set Ci. After obtaining the k dummy location sets, the 
ADLS algorithm sorts the probabilities of set Ci (1 ≤ i ≤ k) 
and the user’s dummy location set in ascending order. Then, 
for each dummy locations set Ci (1 ≤ i ≤ k), the ADLS 
algorithm calculates the variance between the set Ci and the 
user’s dummy location set, and determines the user’s real 
location based on the variance. For example, if the variance 
between the set Ci and the user’s dummy location is the 
smallest, the ADLS algorithm infers that the user’s real 
location is location i. The following shows how the ADLS 
algorithm works. 
  (i) In the first step, the LBS server needs to get the 
anonymity degree of a user based on the user’s location 
information. Let k denotes a user’s anonymity degree, set R 
denotes a user’s location information. 
(ii) LBS server reads all the query probabilities and then 
sorts query probabilities of all locations in ascending order. 
(iii) For each location in set R, the LBS server needs to 
selects 2k-2 candidate locations (denoted as set Dj), in which 
k-1 locations are left before the user’s real location and the 
other k-1 locations are right after the user’s real location in 
the sorted list. Then, the LBS server puts the user’s real 
location in Cj (j ∈ [1, k]). 
  (iv) Find the maximum and minimum from set Cj. Let pmax 
denote the maximum and pmin denote the minimum. Then, it 
finds two locations in set Dj, which is the maximum of the 
probability set being less than pmin, denoted by pmin-max, and 
the other is the minimum of the probability set being greater 
than pmax, denoted by pmax-min. Finally, it compares the entropy 
H(Cj, pmax-min) and H(Cj, pmin-max), and puts the location in set 
Cj, which achieves a larger entropy. 
(v) Repeat step (iv) until the size of set Cj is k. 
(vi) Finally, LBS server needs to determine which one is 
the user’s real location. Specifically, for a particular chosen 
set Cj , it computes the variance according to Formula (8). 
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where ri ∈ R, ci ∈ Cj. The ADLS algorithm then uses the 
locations with the least variance as the user’s real location:  
S = arg minSj            (9) 
 
Algorithm 1: Attack algorithm for DLS (ADLS) 
Input: Historical query probabilities of all locations denoted 
as P; a user’s location information R. 
Output: The optimal location. 
1: Sort the elements in P and R in ascending order;  
2: k  user’s anonymity degree 
3: for (i=1; i k; i++) do  
4:   Set Ci ←read one location L from set R which isn’t read 
before; 
5:   Choose k-1 locations left before and k-1 locations right 
after location L in the sorted list as candidate location 
set iD ; 
6:   for (j=1; j k; j++) do 
7:       pmax←max(Ci); 
8:       pmin ←min(Ci); 
9:     Find one location from set Di, which is the maximum 
of the probability set being less than pmin in set Di, 
denoted as pmin-max ; 
10:     Find one location from set Di, which is the 
minimum of the probability set being greater than 
pmax in set Di, denoted as pmax-min; 
11:     if H(Ci , pmax-min) > H(Ci , pmin-max ) then 
12:        Ci←Ci∪{pmax-min}, Di←Di\{pmax-min}; 
13:     else 
14:        Ci←Ci∪{pmin-max}, Di←Di \{pmin-max}; 
15:     end 
  
16:  end for 
17:  Sort the elements in Ci in ascending order; 
18:  2
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
   
19: end for 
20: return arg min Si 
5.4 Performance Evaluation 
  In this subsection, we evaluate the effectiveness of our 
proposed ADLS algorithm through simulation experiments. 
5.4.1 Simulation Environment 
In this set of simulations, the service area of LBS provider 
is divided into n n  cells with equal size. We assume that 
each cell has already had a historical query probability based 
on the users’ previous queries. For measuring the probability 
of query recognition, which denotes the probability for the 
proposed ADLS algorithm to successfully identify a user’s 
real location from the chosen dummy locations, we use the 
DLS algorithm to generate dummy locations and submit 1000 
queries in the simulations. 
  In our simulations, k is related to k-anonymity and denotes 
the anonymity degree. Given the value of k, m denotes the 
number of cases that randomly choose k-1 cells from 2k cells, 
whose maximum value is 𝑪𝟐𝒌
𝒌−𝟏 . For evaluating the ADLS 
algorithm, the following four scenarios are considered in our 
simulations: 
 Scenario-1: The value of m varies from 100 to 1000. 
 Scenario-1.1: The value of k varies from 5 to 7. 
 Scenario-1.2: The value of k varies from 10 to 14. 
 Scenario-2: The value of k varies from 5 to 15, and the 
values of m are set to be 1  104, 5  104 and1  105, 
respectively. 
5.4.2 Numeric Results 
For evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed ADLS 
algorithm, we have conducted extensive simulations. We 
have evaluated the performance of the ADLS algorithm in 
terms of probability of query recognition under different 
scenarios with different values of k and m. Based on the 
analysis of the DLS Algorithm in Section 4, we can see that 
if a user’s chosen optimal location set at location i is different 
from that of location j (i and j denote two different locations), 
the ADLS Algorithm with high probability to infer the user’s 
real location from the dummy locations generated by DLS 
Algorithm. 
Simulation Results Under Scenario-1.1: We explore the 
relationship between m and the probability of query 
recognition. From Figure 1, we can see that the probability of 
query recognition generally increase with the growth of m. 
The reason is that larger m leads to the chosen dummy 
location in DLS algorithm to be closer to the optimal dummy 
location set, which enables the ADLS algorithm to identify 
the user’s real location with high probability. Figure 1 also 
shows that greater k leads to lower probability of query 
recognition while lower k results in higher probability of 
query recognition and this can be explained as follows. First, 
the maximum of m is 𝑪𝟐𝒌
𝒌−𝟏, and  𝑪𝟐𝒌
𝒌−𝟏 exponentially increases 
with the growth of k. Second, for a given value of m, smaller 
anonymity degree k results in that the value of m is more close 
to the maximum one. Therefore, the user’s chosen dummy 
locations are more likely to be close to the optimal dummy 
locations. 
 
Fig.1: The probability of query recognition achieved with different 
anonymity degrees k under Scenario-1.1. 
Simulation Results Under Scenario-1.2: In this set of 
simulations, we explore the relationship between m and the 
probability of query recognition when m and k become 
greater. Comparing with the results of Scenario-1.1, we 
observe that although the value of m and the value of k 
become greater, the probability of query recognition does not 
be improved. The reason is that when the value of k becomes 
greater, the higher probability of query recognition can be 
obtained only with greater value of m. Moreover, a small 
difference in the anonymity degree k will lead to a great 
difference in the value of m when achieving the same 
probability of query recognition in the ADLS algorithm. 
 
Fig.2: The probability of query recognition achieved in different 
anonymity degree k under Scenario-1.2. 
Simulation Results Under Scenario-2: Figure 3 shows 
the relationship between k and the probability of query 
recognition.Generally, for a given value of m, the probability 
  
of query recognition will be influenced by the value of k. The 
results show that the greater the value of k is, the lower the 
probability of query recognition is. Furthermore, greater m 
leads to higher probability of query recognition while lower 
k results in lower probability of query recognition when k≥8. 
Moreover, different values of m have almost the same 
probability of query recognition when k≤7. The reason is that 
the smaller k makes the value of m to be close to the 
maximum value. Therefore, the user can select the optimal 
location set with higher probability. 
 
Fig.3: The probabilities of query recognition under Scenario-2. 
6. DLP ALGORITHM DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
In this section, we give the detailed descriptions for the DLP 
algorithm, and present the performance evaluations. 
6.1 DLP Algorithm Description 
The basic idea of Dummy Location Privacy-preserving 
(DLP) algorithm is to select the optimal dummy locations 
considering that the adversary may exploit some side 
information, and make different choice for different privacy 
requirements of different users. We adopt a greedy approach 
to search a large database to find an optimal set of dummy 
locations. For achieving k-anonymity, we successively select 
k-1 other locations from all locations in the location map, 
which must make sure that the current entropy is the biggest. 
For example, if the DLP algorithm has already chosen i 
locations (where i < k), when choosing the (i+1)th location, it 
must ensure that Hi+1 is the largest for all residual locations. 
Hi+1 is defined in Equation (10). 
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where pj denotes the users’ historical query probability at 
location j. The following shows how the proposed DLP 
algorithm works. 
(i) First, a user needs to set a proper anonymity degree k, 
which is closely related to the user’s requirement on location 
privacy. Although a bigger k leads to higher anonymity 
degree, it also causes a higher overhead due to the cost for 
selecting dummy locations. 
(ii) At the beginning, the DLP algorithm needs to read all 
the obtained query probabilities from the LBS server and then 
sort the query probabilities in ascending order. Let p denote 
the query probability of the user’s real location. For the sorted 
list, the DLP algorithm calculates the number of locations 
which have the same query probability as p, which is denoted 
by ?̅?. If ?̅? is large enough, it puts half of them before and 
the other half of them after the real location. 
(iii) If ?̅? ≥ k, DLP algorithm selects k-1 locations which 
have the same query probability as p from the sorted list. 
Then, it outputs the chosen k-1 dummy location and the user’s 
real location. 
(iv) If k/4 ≤ ?̅? ≤ k, the algorithm selects ?̅?-1 locations 
which have the same query probability as p from the sorted 
list. We use set C to denote the ?̅?-1 dummy locations and the 
user real location. In the sorted list, the algorithm selects k-?̅? 
locations left before and other k-?̅? locations right after the 
real location as 2(k- ?̅?)) candidate locations, whose query 
probabilities are different from p. Let set S denotes the 2(k-?̅?) 
candidates. The reason for choosing 2(k-?̅?) candidates for 
dummy locations is to make sure to get large enough entropy. 
Otherwise, it goes to Step (vii). 
(v) To achieve k-anonymity, it needs to successively select 
residual k-?̅? locations from set S. For the ith (?̅?< i ≤ k) dummy 
location, it must ensure that the Hi is maximum for all 
residual locations in set S. 
(vi) When the size of C is k, DLP outputs the set C. 
(vii) If ?̅?< k/4, the DLP chooses 2k-ε locations left before 
and other 2k-ω locations right after the real location as 4k-ω-
ε candidates from the sorted list. We use set 𝑆̅ to denote the 
4k-ω-ε candidates. Both ω and ε are set by users based on 
their privacy requirements. Generally, ω is smaller than ε. Let 
set 𝐶̅ denote a user’s real location. It randomly selects one 
location as a dummy location from set S, and put this location 
into set 𝐶̅. 
(viii) For achieving k-anonymity, the successively selects 
residual k-2 locations from set 𝑆̅. For the ith (2 < i ≤ k) dummy 
location, it must ensure that Hi is the largest for all residual 
locations in set 𝑆̅. 
  (ix)When the size of 𝐶̅ is k, DLP outputs the set 𝐶̅. 
 
Algorithm 2: Dummy Location Privacy-preserving (DLP) 
Input: The set of historical query probabilities P; users’ real 
location. 
Output: The optimal set of dummy locations, C. 
1: Sort P in ascending order; 
2: H ← select the locations which have the same query 
probability as users’ real location from sorted P; 
3: if (size (H)  k) then 
  
4:    C ← randomly select k locations including the user 
real location from H; 
5: else if (k/4 < size(H) < k ) then 
6:    k
__
← size(H), C←H;  
7:    S← choose 2(k-k
__
) candidate locations whose query 
probabilities are similar to the user’s real location; 
8:    for (j = 1; j k-k
__
; j ++) do 
9:        Choose one location l from set S, such that H(C, 
q) is the maximum in set S; 
10:       C← C ∪ {l}, S ← S \{l}; 
11:   end for 
12: else  
13:    S ← choose 4k-ω-ε candidate locations whose query 
probabilities are similar to the user’s real location; 
14:    Randomly choose location i from S; 
15:    C← H ∪ {i}; 
16:    for ( j = 1; j k-2; j + +) do 
17:        Choose one location h from S, which makes 
sure that H(C, q) is the maximum in set S; 
18:        C ← C ∪ {h}, S ← S \{h}; 
19:    end for 
20: end if 
21: return the optimal set of dummy locations, C . 
6.2 Security Analysis 
This subsection shows that how to resist the colluding 
attacks and inference attacks to protect user’s location 
privacy through the proposed DLP algorithm. 
1) Resistance to the Colluding Attack: To obtain user’s 
location privacy, passive attackers may collude with other 
users or with the LBS provider for various purposes. 
Definition 1: A scheme can resist the colluding attack if 
the probability of successfully identifying a user’s real 
location from the user’s location information does not 
increase with the growth of the size of the colluding group. 
Theorem 1: The DLP algorithm can resist the colluding 
attack. 
Proof: A colluding attack happens among a set of users 
who want to identify a user’s real location out from the 
submitted k locations. In our scheme, each user protects 
her/his location privacy by selecting other dummy locations. 
When an attacker first compromises a user UA, he/she will 
obtain the user’s location information including k locations. 
Since the k locations have similar historical query 
probabilities, the attacker has no clue about the user’s real 
location and only randomly guesses the user’s real location 
out from the intercepted k locations. Thus, the probability of 
successfully identifying the user’s real location is 1/k. Then, 
the attacker intercepts the LBS query of user UB, and obtains 
the user’s location information. However, the probability of 
successfully identifying a user’s real location remains stable 
in our scheme. The reason is that there are no correlations 
between the selected dummy locations of users UA and UB. 
Therefore, the attacker can only identify each user’s real 
location randomly from the intercepted k dummy locations. 
Similarly, when a colluding group has more members involve, 
the attacker can only randomly guess each user’s real location 
from the intercepted k dummy locations. This implies that the 
probability of successfully identifying the user’s real location 
out from the chosen dummy locations remains stable (i.e., 
1/k)in our scheme. 
In an extreme case that the passive adversary compromise 
the LBS server and get all information the LBS server has, 
he/she can turn to be an active adversary. For an active 
adversary, he/she can perform the inference attack. 
2)Resistance to the Inference Attack: In this part of 
analysis, we assume that the LBS provider is an active 
attacker. The LBS provider knows a user’s historical query 
probabilities of all locations, the historical queries and the 
current queries of users. 
Definition 2: A scheme can resist the inference attack if 
attackers cannot successfully identify the user’s real location 
from user’s location information. 
Theorem 2: DLP scheme can resist the inference attack.  
Proof: In the DLP scheme, since the chosen k locations 
have similar historical query probabilities, although the LBS 
provider knows the historical query probabilities of all 
locations, he/she cannot determine which one is the user’s 
real location in the k locations. Even then he/she tries to 
reverse the algorithm, but he/she will also be failed. The 
reasons are explained in the follows. Let us recall the step (3) 
to step (11) of the DLP scheme mentioned in Section 6.1. In 
these steps, since the DLP scheme can guarantee that there 
are enough locations whose historical query probabilities are 
as same as that of the user’s real location in the chosen 
dummy locations, thus the LBS server still cannot obtain the 
user’s real location by reversing the algorithm. Furthermore, 
let us recall the step (13) to step (18) of the DLP scheme. In 
these steps, since step (13) and step (14) of DLP can ensure 
the uncertainty of the selection, the LBS server also cannot 
obtain the real location by running our algorithm several 
times. 
6.3 Performance Evaluation 
For evaluating the performance of DLP algorithm, we have 
conducted extensive simulations in this subsection. 
6.3.1 Simulation Environment 
Similar to Section 5.4, we divide the location map into
n n  cells with equal size. Each cell has a query probability 
based on the query history. We conduct simulations on the 
following three scenarios to evaluate the performance of the 
DLP algorithm. 
 Scenario A: Let user be located in a cell such that there are 
many (more than k) cells that have the same historical 
query probability as the user’s current location. In this 
scenario, the chosen dummy locations have the same query 
probability as that of the user’s real location. 
 Scenario B: Let user be located in a cell such that the 
number of cells that have the same historical query 
  
probability as that of the user’s current location is slightly 
less than k but greater than one quarter of k. In this scenario, 
it can guarantee that there are enough locations have the 
same query probability as that of the user’s real location in 
the chosen dummy locations. 
 Scenario C: Let user be located in a cell such that there are 
a few (i.e., less than one quarter of k) cells have same 
historical query probability as that of the user’s current 
location. In this scenario, there are few locations that have 
the same query probability as that of the user’s real location 
in the chosen dummy locations. 
6.3.2 Simulation Results 
For evaluating the effectiveness of our proposed DLP 
algorithm, we have conducted extensive simulations.We 
have compared the performance of two algorithms in terms 
of the running time and the privacy level under various 
anonymity degree requirements of users. We also compare 
the probability of query recognition under Scenario C. 
 
Fig.4: Entropy and running times under Scenario A 
 
Fig.5: Entropy and running times under Scenario B 
 
Fig.6: Entropy and running times under Scenario C 
Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate the results for 
DLS algorithm and DLP algorithm, respectively. The results 
show the running time and the privacy level in terms of 
entropy under different scenarios. In Figure 4, the DLP 
algorithm and the DLS algorithm have the same entropy, but 
there are large differences in the running times. Moreover, 
the running time of DLS algorithm rapidly increases with the 
growth of the value of k (i.e., anonymity degree), but the 
running time of DLP algorithm varies little. The reason is that 
the DLS algorithm adopts enumeration method to select k 
dummy locations which make the entropy is largest while the 
DLP algorithm adopts greedy method to successively select 
k dummy locations. The computational complexity of the 
DLS algorithm increases with the growth of the value of k, 
but the computational complexity of the DLP algorithm 
almost remains stable. From Figure 5 and Figure 6, we can 
see that Scenario B and Scenario C have the similar trend on 
results as Scenario A. We also note that the largest entropy 
appears in Scenario A, whereas the smallest entropy appears 
in Scenario C for both the DLS and DLP algorithms. This is 
because that there are more than k locations whose historical 
query probabilities are the same as that of the user’s real 
location in Scenario A, but there are only enough or few 
locations whose historical query probabilities are the same as 
that of the user’s real location in Scenario B or C. Moreover, 
we can obtain the maximum entropy Hmax = log2 k under 
Scenario A. Thus, the DLS and DLP algorithms can achieve 
larger entropy in Scenario A than that in Scenario B or C. 
Figure 7 illustrates the probability of query recognition in 
the different schemes. The simulation results show that the 
DLP algorithm has lower probability of query recognition 
than the DLS algorithm under the same attack. Moreover, the 
probability of query recognition does not vary much with the 
anonymity degree k in the DLP algorithm compared with the 
DLS algorithm. Furthermore, although the probability of 
query recognition of the DLS algorithm decreased with the 
growth of the value of k, the probability of query recognition 
  
is still higher than that of the DLP algorithm. In particular, 
when the number of cases for randomly selecting k-1 cells 
from 2k cells achieves the maximum C
k-1 
2k , the probability of 
query recognition can be near 100% for the DLS algorithm. 
Therefore, the DLP algorithm has a better performance on 
probability of query recognition than DLS algorithm. 
 
Fig.7: The probability of query recognition for Scenario C 
7. DISCUSSION 
Two topics, our contributions in the data-driven IoT service 
and the extension of this work, are presented for discussion. 
7.1 Our contributions in data-driven IoT services 
  The data-driven IoT services take consideration for big 
data and IoT fusion which have become increasing important 
for security. Our contributions are summed up as follows. 
The DLP algorithm can satisfy velocity since the rate of data 
processing is fast and efficient, with a better performance 
than the competing DLS algorithm as demonstrated in 
Section 6.3. The DLP algorithm has been tested with three 
different user scenarios and results are consistent and 
accurate. Experiments with ADLS also support the 
consistency and accuracy of probability of query recognition. 
Thus, our work also satisfies veracity for data-driven IoT 
services. Finally, the cases presented in our paper illustrate 
that the DLP can be useful to protect the users’ privacy and 
validate results with the users’ real locations. Hence, validity 
for data-driven IoT services has been demonstrated in our 
theoretical development supported by simulation results. 
7.2 Extension of Our Work 
Multi-layered security proposed by Chang et al. [40] has 
demonstrated that penetration testing and ethical hacking of 
injecting 10,000 known viruses and Trojans in 2013 can be 
blocked and isolated, with 99.9% success rate. Multi-layered 
security can be blended with ADLS as an emerging IoT 
service to ensure that hacking by malicious files injections 
can be minimized. Experiments demonstrated by Chang and 
Ramachandran [41] have demonstrated that when 10 
petabytes of data has been undergone for penetration ethical 
tests, multi-layered security can block and kill 99.9% of 
known 2013 vulnerability. In addition, locations can be 
pointed back to the Data Center hosting secure mobile 
services, so that anyone who plan to track users, the only 
locations shown are the central server for mobile services 
without revealing the exact users’ locations. 
8. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we first theoretically analyze the performance 
of the Dummy-Location selection (DLS) algorithm, which is 
an efficient approach to protect users’ location privacy in 
LBS for IoT. Then, we design an Attack algorithm for DLS 
algorithm (ADLS), whose goal is to identify the user’s real 
location from chosen dummy locations generated by DLS 
algorithm. For efficiently preserving users’ location privacy, 
we also propose a new Dummy Location Privacy-preserving 
(DLP) algorithm, which takes into account the equilibrium 
between the computational cost (i.e., time complexity) and 
the privacy requirements of users. Based on the obtained side 
information and the entropy metric, DLP algorithm greedily 
selects dummy locations to achieve the optimal privacy level 
of k-anonymity. We also analyze the security performance of 
the proposed DLP algorithm against potential attacks in the 
data-driven IoT service. Finally, we evaluate the performance 
of our DLP algorithm and ADLS algorithm by conducting 
extensive simulation experiments under various scenarios. 
Our simulation results show that our ADLS algorithm has 
high probability of identifying the user real location from the 
dummy locations generated by DLS algorithm. Moreover, 
comparing with the DLS algorithm, our DLP algorithm has 
lower probability of revealing the user real location under the 
same attack, and can reduce the computational cost (i.e., time 
complexity) when providing same privacy level as the DLS 
algorithm. We explain our contributions for the data-driven 
IoT service and justify that our work can make greater 
impacts while blending with multi-layered security to prevent 
attacks and preserve location privacy. 
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